Abstract: On the basis of the signatures scheme without trapdoors from lattice, which is proposed by Vadim Lyubashevsky in 2012, we present a new ring signature scheme from lattice. The proposed ring signature scheme is an extension of the signatures scheme without trapdoors. We proved that our scheme is strongly unforgeable against adaptive chosen message in the random oracle model, and proved that the security of our scheme can be reduced to the hardness of the small integer solution (SIS) problem by rejection samplings. Compared with the existing latticebased ring signature schemes, our new scheme is more efficient and with shorter signature length.
Introduction
Recent studies show that the cryptography schemes based on the problems of large integer factoring and discrete logarithm h ave been unable to resist the quantum attacks, so we must research more efficient and more secure new cryptosystems to resist the quantum attacks. In the 18th century, mathematicians Lagrange, Gauss and Minkowski began to study lattice. Because lattice is of linear structure and the operation based on the lattice is mostly linear, the hard problem on lattice can be used to build new and efficient public key cryptosystems. The lattice-based cryptosystem is assumed can resist quantum attacks, so far the quantum algorithm [1] which can solve the hard problems on the lattice has not emerged in polynomial time , therefore the lattice-based cryptography has became one of the best choice in the era of quantum computing time. Constructing new public key cryptosystems based on the hard problem in lattice has become a new research hotspot of cryptography.
Ring Signature
A digital signature is a kind of encryption technology, which has message integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. There has been a class of digital signatures which is known as the group digital signature. In the cryptosystem, the entity is a group, and the membership is a complex structure. A g roup-oriented digital signature contains various different types of digital signatures, such as group signature, ring signature, signature threshold.
2001, Rivest et al. proposed a new signature technique called ring signature in the context of anonymously leaked secret [2] . Ring signature can be regarded as a special group signature [3] . There is no established process group, and for those verifiers, the signer is completely anonymous. Meanwhile, ring signature provides a clever method for anonymous leaking secrets. This unconditional anonymity in long-term protection of information needs some special environment. Because of its unique nature, the ring signature technique can be widely used in anonymous electronic voting, e-government and e-currencies.
2004, Yevgeniy Dodis et al. discussed ad-hoc groups anonymous authentication issues [4] , and presented a ring signature scheme based on one-way accumulators [5] . Gan Zhi et al. used the valve channel method of embedding authentication information to construct a more efficient verifiable ring signature scheme [6] . Amit KAwasthi put forward an efficient identity-based ring signature and proxy ring signature scheme [7] . Javier Herranz et al. put forward a new identity-based ring signature scheme [8] . JiQiang Lv et al. have proposed a ring authenticated encryption scheme which is the combination of encryption and authentication signature [9] and has the verifiability. Tianjie Cao improved the group signature scheme [11] . Tony K.Chan put forward the concept of blind ring signature [12] .
2005, KCLee put forward a revocable anonymous ring signature scheme [13] . Patrick P.Tsang designed an association ring signature scheme [14] , which can be used for electronic voting and electronic cash systems. Lan Nguyen constructed an accumulator based on bilinear pairing identity-based ring signature scheme [15] , and the signature length is fixed. Qianhong Wu et al. constructed an efficient blind ring signature scheme [16] . Qiang Lei et al. constructed an anonymous fingerprinting protocol with the ring signature scheme [17] . Joseph K.Liu et al. who focused on the key leak issues the first time described a forward security ring signature and key encapsulation ring signature scheme [18] , and then extended it to the threshold scheme.
In 2006, Yiqun Chen put forward a suitable P2P network identity-based anonymous designated ring signature scheme [19] . Adam Bender analyzed the security definition of the ring signature scheme and fully taken into account the actual ability of an attacker. Eventually, he gave more reliable security definitions and proposed security in the standard model of the two ring signature schemes [20] .
In 2008, Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan raised a hash-and-sign signature scheme based on the hardness of worst-case lattice problem [21] . Lyubashevsky and Micciancio built a signature scheme based on the hardness of worst-case ideal lattice problem [22] . However, the hash-and-sign signature scheme is more inefficient and with larger key length, so it has the higher storage costs.
In 2009, due to the inefficiency of the hash-and-sign signature, Lyubashevshy proposed a new digital signature scheme, which using Fiat-Shamir framework based on the hardness of worst-case ideal lattice problem [23] . The scheme was the only one using the Fiat-Shamir technique at that time. It has made a major contribution to building lattice-based signature scheme using the Fiat-Shamir technique. The first contribution of this work is adapting the ring-SIS based scheme to one based on the hardness of the regular SIS problem. The second contribution is reducing the signature length to ) ( n O . The third contribution is showing that the parameters of the scheme can be set so that the resulting produces shorter signatures.
2010, Wang and others, who based Cash signature scheme, proposed a latticebased ring signature scheme against the fixed ring attack in the standard model [24] . A disadvantage of this scheme is that the dimension of the new bonsai tree should be expanded larger than the bonsai tree in the original signature, because the ring members need to join the others' public keys. That makes the ring signature scheme has larger key size and higher storage cost. But this scheme only uses a small integer with modular multiplication and modular addition, it has high computational efficiency.
In 2012, MiaomiaoTian, who added messaging technology based Boyen' s scheme, proposed a ring signature scheme based on lattice [25] and gave formal security proof in the standard model. This scheme is security under adaptive chosen message attack. Although the scheme has high efficiency, its public size, private size and signature length are large, and it has high storage cost.
In 2012, Vadim Lyubashevsky presented a signature scheme without trapdoor [26] based on lattice. The scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model. Its private key, public key and signature size are much smaller than the hash-andsign signature scheme. The scheme greatly reduces the storage cost and has great efficiency improvement.
Our contribution
We present a new lattice-based ring signature scheme based on Vadim Lyubashevsky' s lattice signatures without trapdoors. That is, our scheme is extension of the Lyubashevsky' s lattice signa tures [26] , we extend it to be a ring signature scheme. The extension need elaborated, in the key generation algorithm, produce the key pair for the each user by trapdoor function. In the signature algorithm, the signer uses the others' public keys and his secret key to generate the ring in the name of all members in the ring. In terms of security, the scheme is based on the hardness of the SIS problem on lattice. The security proof depend on the theory of rejection sampling in [26] . In the random oracle model, our scheme can be proved strongly unforgeable against adaptive chosen message s and ensure unconditional anonymity by rejection sampling. Compared with the lattice-based ring signature scheme proposed in literature [24, 25] , our scheme has a very major improvement on enhanc ing the efficiency, such as the running time, the key size and the signature length. Compared with the traditional lattice-based ring signature scheme, our scheme in the signing process just uses the vector matrix multiplication instead of other algorithms similar to extend base algorithm. Therefore, our scheme has a small amount of operations and the running time is short. In terms of the storage space, our scheme has shorter signature length and save s the signature space consumed in the store. , the lattice generated by them is defined as
We refer to We say that the rank of the lattice is n and its dimension is m. If n=m, the lattice is called a full-rank lattice. The below lemma collects some basic facts about the discrete Normal distribution over m Z .
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Ring Signature
We will describe a ring signature scheme by triple of algorithm (Ring-gen, Ringsign, Ring-verify).
Ring-gen
The Ring-gen algorithm is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that takes as input a security parameter n and output a key pair pk i sk i . Different key pairs may come from different public key systems.
Ring-sign
This algorithm is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that takes as input a set of parameters ρ , a signing key sk j , a message µ , and a set of public
, outputs a ring signature z. A certain parameter of z is connected into a ring according the rules. The signer uses the others' public keys to generate a ring with a fracture, and put his private key into the ring to make it become a complete ring.
Ring-verify
The algorithm is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a set of parameters ρ , a ring signature z on a message µ , and outputs True or False for accept or reject respectively.
Security of the ring signature scheme
In order to be considered secure, a ring signature scheme must satisfy the properties of both anonymity and unforgeability.
Anonymity
If the probability of an adversary Γ wins the anonymity game with the polynomial time is negligible, the ring signature scheme has the anonymity property. The anonymity game is defined as follows.
(1) The challenger ψ chooses the system parameter n, and runs the ring-gen algorithm, then outputs a key pair { } ( )
. ψ sends a set of public key
(2) Γ asks the ring signature to ψ for a ring
, a message µ and
of the signer. ψ outputs a ring signature by running the ringsign algorithm, and sends the result to the adversary Γ . 
unforgeability
There is a polynomial-time reduction from the unforgeability of the ring signature scheme to the hard problem. There is a polynomial-time forger F, who can query the random oracle H and the Ring-sign algorithm. If F can forge a valid ring signature with probabilityδ , then there exist a polynomial-time algorithm who can solve the hard problem with some probability. We can prove the unforgeability property by the hardness of the hard problem. The proof consists of the following four steps:
(1) Setup: The challenger ψ designs Hybrid algorithm to replace the ring signing. T he advantage that the forger F distinguishes the actual Ring-sign algorithm from the one in Hybrid is negligible.
(2) Query Pha se: The forger F, who can query the Ring-sign algorithm, inputs a message µ , a ring
and an index i 0 of the signer, then obtains the ring signature. Meanwhile, F can also query the random oracle H.
(3) Forgery Phase: F produces a valid ring signature ) , ( c z with probability δ , we will show that c comes from query phase with large probability.
(4) Reduction: Discuss the source of c in two cases. c comes from the query to the ring signing or the random oracle H. In each case, we show that there is a polynomial-time algorithm which can solve the hard problem with some probability respect to δ .
Lattice-Based Ring Signature Scheme under the Random Oracle Model
In this section we will give our lattice-based ring signature scheme, the scheme is as follows. 
, we run the algorithm
k times with a positive integer
. Where vector
is the j-th 
Sign.
Take as input a message µ , a ring R of l members with public keys
, and a private key j S of the signer j. 
Otherwise, the verifier rejects.
Firstly we will claim that our scheme is correct. Let ( )
be the signature generated by the user j. We will apply the rejection sampling theorem. c S j in the signature algorithm is equivalent to the random vector v in Lemma 3.1. Therefore, from the above argument we can conclude that our ring signature scheme is correct.
Anonymity
Theorem 6.1(Anonymity): The probability of an adversary won the anonymity game with the polynomial time is negligible. Therefore, the ring signature scheme is of anonymity.
Proof: Given a challengerψ , and an adversaryΓ , consider the following game: 2. ψ answers the signing query of adversary Γ ,with a ring
, and a message µ . ψ sends the results of the ring-sign to the adversary Γ . 5. Γ outputs a bit b′ as a guess of the random bit
If we running the ring-sign algorithm by the private key 
Unforgeability
Before proving the unforgeability, we need to prove the following theorem, there exists a collision of the vector s with certain probability. 
, then with probability 1-2 -100 , there exists another
Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 5.2 in the literature [26] . Notice that A can be thought of as a linear transformation whose range has size n q .This means that there are at most In the process of proving unforgeability, we will use the following algorithms Hybrid1 and Hybrid2. When the adversary asks to the signature, the challenger can use the algorithm Hybrid1 or Hybrid2 to replace the real signature algorithm, and reply to adversary' s signature queries. The following theorem can prove that the statistical distance between the algorithm Hybrib1 or Hybrid2 and the real signature algorithm is negligible. Proof: The theorem is proved by theorem 6.4 and theorem 6.5. In theorem 6.4, we will show that our ring signing algorithm can be replaced by Hybrid2, and the statistical distance between the two outputs will be at most . In theorem 6.5, we will show that if a forger can produce a forgery with non-negligible probability δ when the ring signing algorithm is replaced by one in Hybrid2, we can utilize him to recover a vector v such that Av =0 and
, with non-negligible probability at
If we assume that the output of the hash function H is 100 bits in the ring signing scheme, the probability is 
+⋅
, the probability that a collision occurs after s queries is at most In conclusion, the statistical distance between the real ring signing algorithm and Hybrid2 is within The forger F can also make queries to the random oracle H, in which case the reply will similarly be the first unused i r in the list ) ,..., 
Efficiency Analysis
The proposed scheme required just a few matrix-vector multiplications in signing algorithm, which is different with the others who use the ExtBasis algorithm. Therefore, our new scheme is more simple, more efficient, and with shorter signature length. In terms of the storage space, the signature is composed of l+1 vectors. Among these, l vectors' length is m, so the length of the signtature is lm+k. Compared to the other schemes, we have made great progress.
Here in 
Conclusion
We present a high efficient lattice-based ring signature scheme, and prove its security of unforgeability in the random oracle model. Our scheme has made a great progress in time efficiency. The length of the signature is also relative improved comparing with others. However, both the length of the public key and private key are longer than the scheme which was presented by Carlos AguilarMelchor in 2013. So the storage cost of the public key and private key is relatively high. Therefore, our work in the future is to transform our scheme to polynomial rings in order to improve the length of the public key and private key.
